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Can a person harbor discriminatory views toward protected 
minority groups, yet still hire a member of that minority group as an 
employee?  That is the question at the heart of the common actor 
inference in Title VII employment discrimination jurisprudence. The 
common actor inference holds if the same supervisor hires an 
employee from a protected minority group, and then fires that 
employee a short period of time later, there is a strong inference that 
discrimination did not factor in the employment decision.
1
 Because the 
burden for proving Title VII discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin lies with the plaintiff, the common 
actor inference is a tool employer-defendants can use to defeat Title 
VII discrimination claims. However, in the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
decision in McKinney v. Sheriff of Whitley County, the court not only 
critiqued the district court’s reliance on the common actor inference, 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.  
1
 Perez v. Thornton’s, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 710 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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but also questioned the utility of the inference in Title VII 
discrimination cases.
2
 This comment will argue that the Seventh 
Circuit was correct in rejecting the defendant’s use of the common 
actor inference in McKinney, and that other circuit courts should 
follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead in limiting the common actor 
inference to an evidentiary issue that can only be argued to the 
ultimate trier of fact at the trial stage of litigation.   
The common actor inference is not codified in Title VII nor 
any other federal civil rights statute.
3
 The first mention of a common 
actor inference was in the Fourth Circuit decision Proud v. Stone, 
which stated, “in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same 
individual and the termination of employment occurs within a 
relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference 
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse 
action taken by the employer.”
4
 In Proud, the Fourth Circuit endorsed 
the use of the common actor inference at the pleading stage, and 
upheld the district court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint 
alleging age discrimination.
5
   
The common actor inference has been adopted across all U.S. 
Circuit Courts, but its application is not uniform. Some circuits,  
including the First, Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth, have adopted the 
Fourth Circuit’s use of the common actor inference and apply it to 
discrimination claims at the pleading and summary judgment stage.
6
  
Other circuits have limited the scope of the common inference to cases 
                                                 
2
 McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty., 866 F.3d 803, 814-15 (7th 
Cir. 2017).  
3
 Cheryl R. Kaiser & Victor D. Quintanilla, The Same-Actor Inference of 
Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal Licensing 
of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. R. 1, 65 (2016).   
4
 Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir. 1991).   
5
 Id. at 797-98.   
6
 See LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Cordell v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 331 F.App’x. 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009); Waldron v. 
SL Industries Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods 
Co. LLC., 413 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2005); Antonio v. Sygma Network Inc., 
458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).   
2
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where there are genuine issues of material fact.
7
 The Seventh Circuit 
has adopted the most narrow application of the common actor 
inference,  holding that the inference should only be considered by the 
ultimate trier of fact and should not be applied in motions to dismiss or 
motions for summary judgment.
8
 The Eleventh Circuit has taken a 
similar approach to the Seventh Circuit.
9
 
 Section I of this comment will discuss the background that 
preceded the passage of Title VII, employees’ protections under Title 
VII, and how a plaintiff brings a Title VII discrimination suit. Section 
II will discuss the background of McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of 
Whitley County, and how the Seventh Circuit reached its decision to 
limit the application of the common actor inference. Section III will 
explain why the Seventh Circuit made the right decision and will 
argue that other circuits should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s approach. 
 
I.  TITLE VII HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
A.  Title VII Protects Members of Protected Classes from 
Employment Discrimination 
 
 Federal protections against employment discrimination, known as 
the Title VII protections, emerge from the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
10
  
The Civil Rights Act was landmark legislation that emerged after a 
long, often bloody struggle to achieve equal rights for minorities in the 
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., Brown v. CSC Logic Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996); Wexler 
v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 2003); Kells v. Sinclair 
Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2000) (abrogated on other 
grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011)). 
8
 McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty., 866 F. 3d 803, 814-15 (7th 
Cir. 2017).   
9
 Williams v. Vitro Serv. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998). 
10
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq.).   
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 The 1963 Civil Rights March in Birmingham, 
Alabama, and the horrifically violent response that accompanied it, is 
often credited with finally spurring Congress to act to protect certain 
employees from discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or 
national origin.
12
 Despite fierce debate in Congress, the Act was 
politically popular enough to pass by well over 100 votes in the House 
of Representatives and with over two-thirds of the members in the 
U.S. Senate, enough to defeat a filibuster.
13
 
 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically prohibits 
“employers,” as defined by the Act,
14
 “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”
15
 The Act also states an employer 
cannot “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin.”
16
   
 Title VII protects employees before and during their relationship 
with the employer.
17
 Before the employment relationship officially 
exists, employers may not advertise for a position by indicating they 
                                                 
11
  Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, 
and the March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 1, 21 (2001).   
12
 Id. at 21-22. 
13
 Id. at 22.  
14
 With some exception, Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in 
an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working 
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012).  
15




 D. Wendy Greene, Categorically Black, White, or Wrong: “Misperception 
Discrimination” and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 87, 
95-96 (2013). 
4
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prefer to hire employers of a certain class, or that the employer will 
not hire a member of a protected class.
18
 Second, employers cannot 
refuse to hire employees for a job because of their status as a member 
of a protected class.
19
  Third, employers may not institute employment 
tests or training programs that are designed to discriminate against a 
protected class of employees or potential employees.
20
 Title VII 
therefore provides remedies to any person who faces employment 
discrimination before the employer-employee relationship begins.
21
 
 Title VII also protects employees once their official relationship 
with an employer begins. An employer is prohibited from firing an 
employee solely because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.
22
  Employers cannot refuse to assign an employee to certain 
duties solely because of their membership in a protected class.
23
  
Employers cannot unfairly segregate or classify their employees at 
work because of the employee’s membership in a protected class.
24
  
Employers also cannot promote or refuse to promote an employee 
based on their, race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.
25
 
 Title VII protects employees who oppose unlawful employment 
practices or file a complaint against their employer for discriminatory 
practices.
26
 This includes protections that allow employees to 
participate in investigations of their employer for discriminatory 
employment practices.
27
  Title VII prohibits an employer from 
retaliating “against any of his employees or applicants for employment 
. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
                                                 
18
 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(b) (“class” as used in this sentence means race, color, 
sex, religion, or national origin). 
19
 Greene, supra note 17, at 95.    
20
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(d); 2000e-2(h). 
21
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
22




 Greene, supra note 17, at 94   
25
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
26
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employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
28
   
 Title VII goes beyond merely providing employees with 
protection from employment discrimination. It also provides 
employees with enforcement provisions and remedies for any 
discrimination they may face.  Title VII created the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which has the power 
to investigate, study, intervene, and assist employees who believe they 
have been victims of prohibited discrimination by their employer or 
potential employer.
29
  The EEOC is designed to work with state and 
local employment enforcement agencies to ensure all claims are 
investigated thoroughly.
30
  The EEOC serves as an enforcement, 
investigatory, and regulatory body.
31
   
 Title VII also specifically allows the Attorney General to bring an 
action against employers for discriminatory employment practices in 
United States District Courts.
32
  Notably, Title VII also contains a fee-
shifting provision that awards a prevailing plaintiff attorney fees if he 
or she can prove employment discrimination under § 2000e-2(m).
33
 
Awards of attorney fees are not the norm in U.S. civil cases, and 
                                                 
28
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
29
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.   
30
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (“[i]n the case of any charge filed by a member of the 
Commission alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a State or 
political subdivision of a State which has a State or local law prohibiting the practice 
alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek 
relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto 
upon receiving notice thereof, the Commission shall, before taking any action with 




 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6. 
33
 42 U.S.C. 2000-e-5(k) (“[i]n any action or proceeding under this subchapter 
the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) 
as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for 
costs the same as a private person.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 
6
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special fee provisions in legislation are a sign that Congress wished to 




B.  Bringing a Title VII Claim as a Plaintiff 
 
 Based on the preceding section, it would be easy to conclude that 
Title VII’s employment protections make it easy for a plaintiff to 
prevail on an employment discrimination claim. Title VII defines 
forbidden acts employers may not engage in, creates an investigative 
and enforcement agency to examine Title VII claims, and provides 
incentives to pursue Title VII actions. However, Title VII’s broad 
provisions and years of judicial interpretation have made it very 
difficult for a plaintiff to prevail on a Title VII claim.   
 Title VII was never intended to protect an employee from being 
discharged or passed over for any reason other than prohibited 
discrimination. Title VII does not protect an employee from being 
discharged for poor performance, inappropriate work activity, poor 
judgment, or disputes with management.
35
 Title VII’s protections are 
thus limited only to cases where the plaintiffs can prove they suffered 
an adverse employment action because of their race, religion, color, 
sex, or national origin.  A Title VII discrimination case over unlawful 
termination is thus decided on the limited scope of whether “the 
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 




 A plaintiff may prove race discrimination by either direct or 
indirect proof, relying on direct or circumstantial evidence.
37
 Because 
direct proof of discrimination is usually present in only the most 
blatant cases, most Title VII cases require indirect proof of 
                                                 
34
 Jeffrey A. Blevins and Gregory J. Schroedter, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: 
Congress Revamps Employment Discrimination Law and Policy, 80 ILL. B.J. 336, 
336 (1992). 
35
 Hill v. St. Louis University, 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8
th
 Cir. 1997). 
36
 Ortiz v. Werner Enter. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). 
37
 Coleman v. Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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 In order to “sharpen the inquiry into the elusive 
factual question of intentional discrimination” the United States 
Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have developed a distinct 
framework demonstrating what a plaintiff needs to prove to prevail on 
a Title VII discrimination claim.
39
  The United States Supreme Court 
established a framework, for plaintiffs who are bringing indirect proof 




C. The McDonnell Douglas Framework 
 
 In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff, an African-American man, 
was laid off as part of general workforce reduction by the McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation.
41
 The plaintiff and other workers protested these 
firings as racially motivated and staged protests at the McDonnell 
Douglas job site.
42
  After the protests ended, plaintiff noticed 
McDonnell Douglas was advertising for open positions, including the 
position the plaintiff used to hold.
43
 McDonnell Douglas declined to 
rehire the plaintiff, citing his participation in the protest activities, and 
the plaintiff  filed a complaint with the EEOC.
44
 The EEOC found 
some cause that McDonnell Douglas had violated Title VII by refusing 
to rehire the plaintiff, and the plaintiff then brought an action in the 
district court.
45
 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims, 
stating that McDonnell Douglas’s “refusal to rehire respondent was 
based solely on his participation in the illegal demonstrations and not 
on his legitimate civil rights activities” or his race or color.
46
 




 Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 8 (1981). 
40
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
41
 Id. at 794. 
42
 Id. at 795. 
43
 Id. at 796. 
44
 Id.  
45
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 Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision to the Eight Circuit 
Court of Appeals.
47
 The Eight Circuit upheld some of the district 
court’s decision, but reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss 
the plaintiff’s complaint for discriminatory hiring practices against 
McDonnell Douglas.
48
 In explaining its decision to remand, the Eight 
Circuit attempted to create a framework for examining Title VII 
employment discrimination claims.
49
 The Eight Circuit stated that 
when the district court considered the evidence offered by the plaintiff 
and McDonnell Douglas, the district court relied on subjective criteria 
which carried little weight in rebutting charges of discrimination.
50
 
The court explained that the plaintiff should be given the opportunity 
to demonstrate that McDonnell Douglas’s reasons for refusing to 
rehire him were mere pretext for discriminatory purposes.
51
 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to better clarify the Eight Circuit’s 




The Supreme Court created a four-element test for a plaintiff to 
establish a prima facie case of Title VII prohibited discrimination. The 
Supreme Court held that for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination in his hiring, the plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) 
he is a member of a racial minority; 2) he applied and was qualified 
for a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) 
despite his qualifications for the position, he was rejected; and 4) after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued 
to seek applications from persons of plaintiff's qualifications.
53
 The 
                                                 
47
 Id.  
48










 Id. at 802. The McDonnell-Douglas framework is now used for any Title VII 
claim where discrimination is alleged, including race, religion, color, sex, or national 
origin.  See Tristin K. Green, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas Framework: 
Circumstantial Evidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 
CALIF. L. R. 983, 985 (1999). 
9
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Supreme Court agreed with the Eight Circuit that the plaintiff did 
demonstrate a prima facie case of race discrimination.
54
 
 After the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden 
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for not hiring the plaintiff.
55
 The Supreme Court stated it is not 
necessary for an employer to delineate every legitimate reason why an 
employer chose to fire or not hire an employee, but makes clear that 
any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision 
relieves the employer from this burden.
56
 The inquiry does not end if 
the employer demonstrates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the hiring decision. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate through evidence that the employer’s stated legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its hiring decision is mere “pretext” to 
hide or overshadow a discriminatory reason.
57
 The Supreme Court 
then remanded the case to the district court with the instructions that 
the plaintiff’s case should be evaluated with the tests stated in this 




 McDonnell Douglas is an example of the Supreme Court creating 
a test that the district courts and circuit courts can follow when 
interpreting and applying legislation from Congress. It also 
demonstrated the burdens a plaintiff carries in proving a Title VII 
discrimination case.  The plaintiff not only carries the initial burden of 
proving a prima facie case, the plaintiff must also have sufficient 
evidence to prove that any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason the 




                                                 
54
 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
55
 Id. at 802-803.  
56
 Id.  
57
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D.  Introduction of Common Actor Inference as an additional 
hurdle to a Title VII claim 
 
 The common actor inference is a judicially-created inference that 
weighs against the plaintiff in a Title VII case. The common actor 
inference developed after the Supreme Court established the 
McDonnell Douglas framework and is a way to help the judge or jury 
better apply the framework in a case.  It is important to understand at 
what point in a Title VII case the common actor inference is 
considered, as it varies from circuit to circuit, and the inference can 
have a more substantial impact on a Title VII case based on when it is 
considered.   
 The first appearance of the common actor inference was in the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
59
 The Fourth Circuit articulated the 
test, which is “in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same 
individual and the termination of employment occurs within a 
relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference 
exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse 
action taken by the employer.”
60
 The Fourth Circuit analyzed the 
common actor inference in the context of the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, and stated “[t]he relevance of the fact that the employee 
was hired and fired by the same person within a relatively short time 
span comes at the third stage of the analysis,” when the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the employer’s stated reason for the employment 
action is mere pretext for a discriminatory purpose.
61
 The court 
explained that if the same employer hired and fired the employee in a 
relatively short time span, this then “creates a strong inference that the 




 U.S. Courts of Appeals vary on what stage of litigation is 
appropriate to consider the common actor inference. There are 
                                                 
59
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typically three ways a Title VII race discrimination case can reach a 
final judgment: 1) an order dismissing the complaint; 2) summary 
judgment before the case reaches the ultimate trier of fact; or 3) a final 
judgment rendered after trial to a judge or jury.
63
 In Proud v. Stone, the 
Fourth Circuit considered evidence of the common actor inference 
when considering a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Title VII 
complaint. Because a motion to dismiss is based solely on the 
pleadings, the Fourth Circuit established that the common actor 
inference can apply before the litigation moves to the fact-finding 
stage.
64
  A majority of the other circuit courts have followed the 
Fourth Circuit’s precedent and allow courts to consider the common 
actor inference when evaluating a plaintiff’s claim in a motion to 
dismiss or in a summary judgment motion.
65
 Other circuits have 
limited the application of the common actor inference to only when 
discrimination has been alleged and there are genuine issues of 
material fact.
66
 However, in McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley 
County, the Seventh Circuit limited the application of the common 
actor inference to the narrowest of circumstances, and stated its 
concern that the common actor inference may be “outgrow[ing] its 





                                                 
63
 See Nana Gyimah-Brempong, Tahl Rabino & Neonu Jewell, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 563, 587 (2002). 
64
 Stone, 945 F.2d at 798.  
65
 See Cordell v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 331 F.App’x. 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Waldron v. SL Industries Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Coghlan v. Am. 
Seafoods Co. LLC., 413 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2005); Antonio v. Sygma 
Network Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006).    
66
 See, e.g., Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 
2003); Kells v. Sinclair Buick-GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 835 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th 
Cir. 2011)). 
67
 McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of Whitley Cnty, 866 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 
2017). 
12
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II. MCKINNEY V. OFFICE OF SHERIFF OF WHITLEY COUNTY 
 
A.  Factual Background and District Court Decision 
 
Sheriff Mark Hodges of Whitley County, Indiana, hired Terrance 
McKinney as a full-time merit officer on August 5, 2013.
68
 McKinney 
was the first-ever black officer in Whitley County.
69
 The merit officer 
position carries a one-year “probationary period” where the officer can 
be fired at the sole discretion of the Sheriff, without input from the 
county merit review board.
70
 The purpose of the probationary period is 
to allow a sheriff to determine if a new officer is capable of 
performing his or her duties before he or she benefits from state law 




 Because McKinney would have been the first black officer in 
Whitley County history, Sheriff Hodges and McKinney discussed 
McKinney’s race during the interview.
72
 McKinney stated that he did 
not expect that he would experience racial discrimination at the 
Sheriff’s Office.
73
  However, throughout his employment, McKinney 
was able to point to specific instances when he was subjected to racist 
or discriminatory words and actions by his fellow officers. McKinney 
related that one officer used the “n-word” in front of him, that officers 
joked about ordering their coffee “like him,” and that certain officers 
would not train him or even speak to him.
74
 Sheriff Hodges 
recommended that McKinney watch the movie 42, which depicts 
Jackie Robinson’s battle to break the color barrier in baseball, and told 
him the movie would “help him out.”
75
 
                                                 
68
















: Outgrowing Its Usefulness: Seventh Circuit Limits the Application
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




 On May 15, 2014, Sheriff Hodges fired McKinney, invoking the 
power he had as Sheriff under the “probationary period.”
76
 Sheriff 
Hodges’ termination letter listed three reasons for firing McKinney: 1) 
submitting false work hours while attending the Indiana Law 
Enforcement Academy; 2) violating standard operating procedure for 
filing complete monthly reports; and 3) violating standard operating 
procedure for fueling county vehicles.
77
 The Whitley County Board of 
Commissioners added more reasons for McKinney’s firing in a 
termination letter sent four days after McKinney’s firing, including 
damaging a county vehicle, failing to complete a transport, and failing 
to follow verbal instructions.
78
 
 After McKinney was terminated, he brought suit against the 
Office of the Sheriff of Whitley County and Deputy Sheriff Tony 
Helfrich in the District Court, alleging several theories, including race 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.
79
 In the course of the defense, 
counsel for the Sheriff’s office offered even more reasons for 
McKinney’s firing, including texting while driving, crashing a county 
vehicle, and being late while transporting a juvenile to court.
80
 After 
pleadings were filed and discovery was completed, the Sheriff’s office 
moved for summary judgment, arguing that under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, McKinney had failed to allege a prima facie case 
of discrimination in order to successfully meet the burden-shifting 
requirement.
81
 The defense relied on an affidavit from Sheriff Hodges, 
which stated the reasons why McKinney was fired, and did not include 
any mention of McKinney’s race.
82
  
 The district court ultimately ruled for the defense and granted 
summary judgment for the Sheriff’s Office.
83
 The court ruled that 
                                                 
76
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McKinney failed to present any direct evidence of discrimination.
84
  
The court also stated McKinney could not point to any direct evidence 
that would constitute a genuine issue of material fact.
85
 The court 
further determined that McKinney failed to meet the Sheriff’s 
legitimate employment expectations, based largely upon the Sheriff’s 
affidavit.
86
 The court also based its decision upon the “strong 
presumption against finding discrimination when the same person 
hires and fires a plaintiff-employee.”
87
 The district court stated “[i]f 
Sheriff Hodges wanted to discriminate against McKinney based on his 




B.  7th Circuit Decision in McKinney v. Office of Sheriff of 
Whitley County  
 
McKinney appealed the district court’s decision to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  A panel consisting of Judges Bauer, Posner, 
and Hamilton unanimously reversed the district court’s decision.
89
  
After a review of the factual and procedural background of the case, 
the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by examining McKinney’s 
presentation of evidence and the Sheriff’s stated reasons for firing 
McKinney.
90
 The Seventh Circuit utilized the elements of prima facie 
case of race discrimination and the McDonnell Douglas framework in 
analyzing the district court’s decision.
91
 
 First, the court examined whether McKinney had met the 
elements for a prima facie case of race discrimination, whether: 1) he 
is a member of a racial minority; 2) his job performance met the 
employer’s legitimate expectations; 3) he suffered an adverse 












 Id. at 815. 
90
 Id. at 808. 
91
 Id. at 807. 
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employment action; and 4) another similarly situated individual who 
was not in the protected class was treated more favorably than him.
92
 
The court noted that it was undisputed that McKinney is a member of 
a protected class and that he suffered an adverse employment action.
93
  
The court stated that for McKinney to prevail under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, he must present sufficient evidence to show that 
his performance met the Sheriff’s legitimate employment expectations 
and that other similarly situated employees who are not in the 
protected class were treated more favorably.
94
  
 The court evaluated the weight of the evidence presented by both 
sides, noting that the Sheriff’s Office offered plausible rationales for 
why McKinney did not meet the Sheriff’s legitimate employment 
expectations.
95
 However, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the district 
court did not give sufficient weight to McKinney’s evidence.
96
 The 
Seventh Circuit ruled the district court failed to properly consider 
McKinney’s legal memorandum, the genuine issues of material fact he 
raised, and the supporting evidence that he offered to show he met the 
Sherriff’s legitimate employment expectations.  The Seventh Circuit 
particularly focused on “the sheer number of rationales the defense has 
offered for firing plaintiff and the quality and volume of the evidence 




 The court examined the Sheriff’s stated reasons for the firing: 1) 
falsifying hours; 2) missing his monthly reports; 3) and misusing the 
gasoline credit card.
98
 After a very thorough review of the Sheriff’s 
evidence and McKinney’s evidence, the court found that McKinney 
had presented sufficient evidence to at least raise a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the Sheriff’s stated reasons for his 




 Id. at 807-08. 
94
 Id. at 808.  
95
 Id. at 814. 
96
 Id. at 813. 
97
 Id. at 810. 
98
 Id. at 810-11. 
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termination were “pretext” for discriminatory actions.
99
 The court then 
pointed out that the Sheriff’s office had offered even more 
explanations for McKinney’s termination after it became clear that 
McKinney intended to sue for discriminatory employment practices.
100
  
The Seventh Circuit examined each of these additional reasons, and 
also found that the plaintiff had offered sufficient evidence in response 




 The Seventh Circuit reminded the district court that when 
evaluating McKinney’s evidence under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework on a summary judgment motion, the question is “simply 
whether McKinney’s evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the plaintiff’s race . . . caused the discharge.”
102
 The 
court concluded that after evaluating McKinney’s testimony, 
interrogatory answers, internal department documents, and other 
evidence, McKinney more than satisfied his burden under McDonnell 
Douglas, and that McKinney had presented enough evidence to permit 
a reasonable factfinder to question whether the Sheriff’s stated reasons 
for firing were pretext for discriminatory actions.
103
 As a result, the 
Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 




 The Seventh Circuit also took time to criticize the district court 
for “overestimat[ing] the strength of the ‘common actor’ inference.”
105
 
The district court cited the common actor inference as further proof of 
its decision, holding that if the Sherriff had wanted to discriminate 
against McKinney, the Sherriff would have refused to hire him in the 
                                                 
99
 Id. at 813. 
100
 Id. at 812. 
101
 Id. at 814. 
102
 Id. at 813. 
103
 Id. at 813-14. 
 
104
 Id. at 815. 
105
 Id. at 814. 
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 The district court relied on the Seventh Circuit’s 
explanation of the common actor inference in previous cases such as 
EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Medical Center, which led the 
district court to believe that the common actor inference applied at the 
pleading or summary judgment stage of a Title VII case.
107
 In 
McKinney, however, the court seemed to walk back some of its 
position in Our Lady of Resurrection, stating that “this inference is not 
a conclusive presumption and . . . it should be considered by the 
ultimate trier of fact rather than on summary judgment or the 
pleadings.”
108
 The common actor inference may be argued to a jury or 
judge in a fact-finding endeavor, but it is not a conclusive presumption 
that applies as a matter of law.
109
 The inference is “just something for 
the trier of fact to consider.”
110
 
 The court further stated “[w]e have tried to impose limits on the 
common actor inference to ensure it does not outgrow its 
usefulness.”
111
 While the court acknowledged that it may be helpful to 
let the jury hear evidence of the common actor inference and weigh 
the inference in the case before it, the court stated the inference is 
helpful only “in some limited situations.”
112
 Yet, the court continued 
that “[t]here are many other occasions, however, where it is unsound 
to infer the absence of discrimination simply because the same person 
hired and fired the plaintiff-employee.”
113
  
 As an example of such a situation, the court pointed out that an 
employer may need to quickly fill a position, and as a result hire an 
individual from a protected class because the supervisor had no other 




 77 F.3d 145, 151-52 (7th Cir. 1996). 
108
 McKinney, 866 F.3d at 814. 
109
 Id.   
110
 Id (citing Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Authority, 315 F.3d 742, 747 (7th 
Cir. 2002)). 
111
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 Once other candidates for that position are available, 
especially non-minority candidates, the employer could then fire the 
minority employee for discriminatory reasons and hire a different 
employee from a non-protected class.
115
 In this circumstance, it would 
not be appropriate to assume that the employer did not act in a 
discriminatory manner just because he or she hired and fired an 
employee from a protected class. Similarly, the court imagined how an 
employer could hire a woman, but then refuse to give her a promotion 
or a raise for discriminatory purposes.
116
 The court also pointed out 
that an employer could hire a woman, but later fire her once she 




 In the closing paragraph of its analysis, the Seventh Circuit stated 
that “examples abound” for why the same employer could hire an 
employee with a nondiscriminatory purpose, but then later fire that 
same employee with a discriminatory purpose.  The court asked the 
district court to image a scenario where: 
 
The same supervisor could hire a county’s first 
black police officer, hoping there would be no racial 
friction in the workplace. But after it became clear 
that other officers would not fully accept their new 
black colleague, that same supervisor could fire the 
black officer because of his race based on a 





Without expressly stating this is what happened in the case of Officer 
McKinney, the Seventh Circuit, at a minimum, demonstrated why the 
common actor inference should not be considered in a motion for 
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summary judgment. There are simply too many plausible scenarios for 
why a supervisor may hire, and then later fire, an employee from a 
protected class for discriminatory reasons to accord the inference a 
significant amount of weight at the pleading or summary judgment 
stage of litigation. 
 McKinney is thus a stark limitation on the common actor inference 
in the Seventh Circuit. Although the court presented its holding in 
McKinney as a logical extension of its previous Title VII 
discrimination and common actor jurisprudence, this is the clearest the 
Seventh Circuit has been about the application of the common actor 
inference. The court definitively stated that the common actor 
inference is not a conclusive presumption that applies as a matter of 
law.
119
 Therefore, the inference cannot be considered in a motion to 
dismiss or a summary judgment motion.
120
 The inference is merely a 
consideration that the ultimate fact-finder, whether a judge or a jury, 
may weigh when making a decision. The Seventh Circuit thus 
presented a very narrow definition and use of the common actor 
inference. 
  
III. ANALYZING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION AND ITS  
IMPACT ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COMMON ACTOR 
INFERENCE 
 
  A. Seventh Circuit exposes logical flaws and uses negative tones 
when addressing the common actor inference 
 
 The Seventh Circuit’s McKinney decision is notable for both the 
ease with which the Seventh Circuit found logical flaws in the 
common actor inference and the almost dismissive tone the court used 
when discussing the inference. After evaluating the approach other 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have taken toward the common actor 
inference, it is clear that the Seventh Circuit took the lead in criticizing 
the use of the common actor inference in Title VII cases. This becomes 
                                                 
119
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abundantly clear upon a close reading of the court’s legal analysis and 
the language it used when discussing the common actor inference. 
 The Seventh Circuit could have invalidated the district court’s 
ruling in McKinney based solely the plaintiff’s evidence, without 
addressing the district court’s reliance on the common actor inference. 
McKinney appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment; all 
the Seventh Circuit needed to find to reverse the district court’s 
decision was find a genuine issue of material fact that would require 
final adjudication by a judge or jury.
121
 The court went through the 
facts presented to the district court in long and painstaking detail, and 
it found many issues of material fact that would be sufficient to reverse 
the grant of summary judgment.
122
 However, the Seventh Circuit went 
beyond just invalidating the circuit court’s decision based on genuine 
issues of material fact; it devoted an entire section to exposing the 
logical flaws in the common actor inference.
123
 
 The Seventh Circuit stated that “examples abound” of scenarios 
where it would be unsound to infer that the same supervisor hiring and 
firing an employee in a short time period did not have a discriminatory 
purpose for doing so.
124
 Although the court stated that examples 
abound, it listed only four examples: 1) a supervisor hires an employee 
from a protected class out of necessity, then later fires that employee 
when members of a nonprotected class are available; 2) a supervisor 
who hires a woman, but refuses to promote her because of her gender;  
3) a supervisor who hires a woman, but later fires her when she 
becomes pregnant; and 4) when a supervisor hires the county’s first 
black police officer and then fires him because of racial friction in the 
department.
125
 These are all very clear and easy-to-follow examples of 
how the common actor inference can be unsound, and unfairly slanted 
toward the supervisor who fires an employee from a protected class.   
                                                 
121
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
122
 McKinney, 866 F.3d at 807-13. 
123
 Id. at 814-15.  
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 However, as the Seventh Circuit suggested, these three examples 
are far from the only ones that expose flaws in the common actor 
inference. Imagine a supervisor who feels compelled to hire an 
employee from a protected class out of a company-wide push to 
increase diversity, only to later fire that employee for discriminatory 
reasons. Or, consider an all-male law firm who hires female partner to 
attract new female clients, only to later fire the female partner because 
she does not “fit-in” with the boy’s club culture. One can also think of 
a scenario where a supervisor hires a Muslim man or woman, but then 
later fires him or her after a domestic terrorist attack because the 
supervisor does not want to associate with people of that religion. 
These are just a few of a multitude of “examples,” as the Seventh 
Circuit said, that demonstrate the inherent flaws of the common actor 
inference, and cast doubt on its usefulness or probative value in Title 
VII discrimination cases. 
 It is also important to note the tone the court uses in discussing the 
common actor inference in McKinney. The Seventh Circuit opened its 
discussion of the common actor inference by stating “the district court 
seems to have overestimated the strength of the common actor 
inference” in reaching its decision.
126
 In its very first sentence on the 
common actor inference, the Seventh Circuit signaled that the common 
actor inference is not an especially strong one because it has been 
“overestimated” by the district court.
127
 The Seventh Circuit then 
explained its interpretation of the common actor inference and took the 
time to clearly explain to the district court how it improperly applied 
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis.
128
 The Seventh Circuit stated that the 
district court may have gone astray by relying on older Seventh Circuit 
cases such as EEOC v. Our Lady of Resurrection Medical Center, a 
1996 case in which the Seventh Circuit implied the common actor 
inference could be used in summary judgment motions.
129
 However, in 
McKinney, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that its decisions since Our 
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Lady of Resurrection have “clarified that this inference is not a 
conclusive presumption and that it should be considered by the 




 The court then stated that it has tried to “impose limits on the 
common actor inference to ensure it does not outgrow its 
usefulness.”
131
 It refered to inference as “just something for the trier of 
fact to consider.”
132
 It stated that the inference may be helpful “in 
some limited situations.”
133
 The court then provided four clear 
examples of when the inference is illogical.
134
 The combination of the 
court’s tone and the narrow application it assigned to the common 
actor inference cannot help but the leave the reader with the 
impression the court does not look upon the inference with great favor. 
In the Seventh Circuit’s own words, the inference is in danger of 
“outgrowing its usefulness,” “just” something to be considered, and is 
only in helpful in “limited circumstances.” These are not words or 
phrases that convey a positive connotation.  
 
 B. Circuit Courts should limit the application of the common actor 
inference to an evidentiary inference at the trial stage 
 
 Despite the Seventh Circuit’s critique of the common actor 
inference and its logical flaws, the court did not completely scrap the 
use of the common actor inference in the Seventh Circuit.
135
 Rather, 
the Seventh Circuit clearly stated limits on the inference and 
proscribes when the inference can be considered. The Seventh Circuit 
framed the common actor inference as an evidentiary issue, and it 




 Id. at 815.  
132
 Id. at 814.  
133




 Id. ([“t]he inference may be helpful in some limited situations, which is 
why we allow the jury to hear such evidence and weigh it for what it is worth” 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
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stated the inference can only considered by the ultimate trier of fact at 
the trial stage of litigation.
136
 
 There are definite practical implications of the Seventh Court’s 
decision in McKinney as it pertains to the common actor inference. A 
defendant may not assert the common actor inference as an affirmative 
defense; it can only be argued at trial as probative evidence. Therefore, 
when a plaintiff brings a Title VII complaint against a defendant-
employer, even if the relationship between the plaintiff and supervisor 
would implicate the common actor inference, the defendant cannot use 
the inference to defeat a complaint in a motion to dismiss or in a 
summary judgment motion in the Seventh Circuit.  
 The court’s decision removed one hurdle a plaintiff must 
overcome to successfully plead Title VII discrimination in the Seventh 
Circuit.  A hypothetical Title VII plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit must 
first plead a prima facie case of discrimination: that he or she is a 
member of a protected class; that he or she was qualified for the 
position; and that he or she suffered an adverse employment action.
137
 
If the plaintiff can successfully plead a prima facie case, then pursuant 
to McDonnell Douglas, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.
138
 At 
this stage in the litigation, there would be no reason for the defendant 
to assert a common actor inference (even if they could) because 
discriminatory acts by the defendant are not considered at this stage.
139
 
If the defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
the employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate through evidence that the employer’s reasons were 
“pretext” for a discriminatory purpose.
140
 It is at this stage that the 
plaintiff begins presenting his or her evidence of the employer’s 
discriminatory actions.  
                                                 
136
 Id. at 814.  
137
 See McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
138




 Id. at 807. 
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 Once the plaintiff has offered evidence of the defendant’s 
discriminatory acts, other circuit courts will allow the defendant to 
introduce the common actor inference to weigh against the plaintiff’s 
evidence.
141
 In Proud v. Stone, the Fourth Circuit stated the fact that 
the same supervisor hired and fired an employee “creates a strong 
inference that the employer's stated reason for acting against the 
employee is not pretextual.”
142
 The Fourth Circuit recognized the 
strong impact this inference has on a plaintiff’s case, and stated “[t]he 
plaintiff still has the opportunity to present countervailing evidence of 
pretext, but in most cases involving this situation, such evidence will 
not be forthcoming. In short, employers who knowingly hire workers 




The Fourth Circuit’s approach is very favorable to defendants, and 
assists defendant-employers in defeating Title VII discrimination 
claims before those claims ever reach an ultimate trier of fact. This 
scenario occurred in the Indiana district court’s decision, where 
McKinney’s complaint was defeated at the summary judgment stage 
based in part on the Sheriff invoking the common actor inference.
144
 
However, as the Seventh Circuit demonstrated in its opinion, there are 
simply too many flaws in the common actor inference to accord it so 
much power at the pleadings or summary judgment stage.
145
  
 The Seventh Circuit’s awareness of how the common actor 
inference can result in illogical conclusions or too strong of an 
advantage for employers led the court to limit the use of the inference 
                                                 
141
 See Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991); LeBlanc v. Great 
American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir. 1993); Cordell v. Verizon Commc’n, 
Inc., 331 F.App’x. 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2009); Waldron v. SL Industries Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 
496 n.6 (3d Cir. 1995); Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC., 413 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 
(9th Cir. 2005); Antonio v. Sygma Network Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 
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 McKinney v. Sheriff of Whitley County, 866 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2017). 
145
 Id. at 815.  
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to only the trial stage of litigation.
146
 The court stated that “the 
common actor inference is a reasonable inference that may be argued 
to the jury, but it is not a conclusive presumption that applies as a 
matter of law.”
147
 The court continued that the defendant may argue 
the inference to the jury, who may then “weigh it for what it is 
worth.”
148
 The court acknowledged the flaws of the inference when it 
is applied as a matter of law at the pleadings or summary judgment 
stages, stating “[i]t is misleading to suggest (as some cases do) that the 
inference creates a ‘presumption’ of nondiscrimination, as that would 
imply that the employee must meet it or lose his case.”
149
 Thus in the 
Seventh Circuit, any employer who wishes to use the common actor 
inference as a way to overcome a Title VII discrimination claim may 






The Seventh Circuit presented the most logical use of the 
common actor inference, if it is to be used at all. As this comment has 
demonstrated, Congress created Title VII to protect certain American 
workers from discriminatory employment actions. The subsequent 
judicial interpretations of Title VII created the very rigorous 
McDonnell Douglas framework that specifies exactly what a plaintiff 
must allege, and eventually prove, in order to succeed on a claim. The 
text of Title VII and the McDonnell Douglas framework already 
provide defendants with a number of protections against frivolous 
claims. Plaintiffs must plead a prima facie case of discrimination 
before defendants even need to respond to charges of discrimination. 
Defendants then have an opportunity to articulate legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for their employment action. Plaintiffs then 
                                                 
146




 Id. at 815. 
149
 Id. at 814 (quoting Herrnreiter v. Chicago Housing Authority, 315 F.3d 
742, 747 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
150
 Id. at 815. 
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must produce actual evidence of discrimination to show that the 
defendant’s reasons are merely pretextual. These steps help ensure that 
only serious and credible Title VII claims can even advance to the 
summary judgment or trial stage. 
The inclusion of the common actor inference in pleadings and 
summary judgment is an example of how a powerful yet ultimately 
flawed judicially-created inference places a significant burden on Title 
VII plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit, and those other circuits who have 
followed the Fourth Circuit’s lead, have acknowledged that the 
common actor inference is a nearly fatal blow to a plaintiff’s claim. A 
plaintiff who has met the prima facie elements of Title VII 
discrimination and demonstrated discrimination through evidence 
should be able to advance to a trial without having to overcome a 
defendant-friendly inference that the Seventh Circuit so easily 
critiqued.  
While the common actor inference can be logical when applied to 
the right scenario, it contains too many easily-identifiable flaws that 
tip the scales towards a defendant. Therefore, the inference should not 
be considered before reaching the ultimate trier of fact. At the trial 
stage, the ultimate trier of fact will have the chance to survey all of the 
evidence presented, including the common actor inference, and will be 
able to weigh the evidence as the he or she sees fit. Applying the 
common actor inference before the trial robs the plaintiff of the chance 
to argue all of its evidence, and ultimately can lead to judgment for the 
defendant for less than solid reasons.  
U.S. Circuit Courts should follow the Seventh Circuit’s lead and 
limit the application of the common actor inference only to the trial 
stage. McKinney’s guidance on the common actor inference will 
achieve Congress’ goal of protecting Americans from discrimination 
based on their race, sex, religion, color, or national origin, while also 
protecting defendants from frivolous claims by plaintiffs.  The 
framework for a Title VII claim is well-established and fair, and 
protects both plaintiffs and defendants equally with a rigid burden-
shifting test.  The common actor inference disrupts this framework by 
shifting the scales too far toward the defendant, and as a result it 
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should be limited in accordance with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
McKinney. 
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